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The statistical saturation attack (SSA) introduced by Collard and Standaert fo-
cuses on the non-uniformity of certain bits in the ciphertext space by fixing certain
bits in the plaintext space. It exploits this non-uniformity by distinguishing an
observed distribution among two known distributions: one is uniform and the
other is non-uniform. To do so, a statistical test, based on a statistical distin-
guisher is required. There exists such statistical distinguishers based on the links
in between SSA and other statistical cryptanalytic techniques. Instead of using
such links, in this thesis we look directly in SSA and develop a statistical distin-
guisher and propose a statistical test based on this distinguisher. The statistical
distinguisher denoted by T is primarily χ2 distributed. Theoretical approxima-
tion of the distribution of T is derived in terms of the size and capacity of the
distribution considering both of the cases of a single fixation and a set of fixations.
The developed model is applied on SMALLPRESENT-[4] for the case of single
fixation and the evolution of the distinguisher is observed both theoretically and
experimentally as the number of encrypted plaintexts increases. In addition to
this, a connection between the error probability of the statistical test and the
number of required plaintexts (in other words data complexity) is also presented
and showed that this theoretical data complexity is in close correspondence to
the observed data complexity in the experiments on SMALLPRESENT-[4].
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
ML Multidimensional Linear
TD Truncated Differential
SS Statistical Saturation
SSA Statistical Saturation Attack
SPN Substitution Permutation Network
a A constant value at the input of an SS trail known as
fixation of the trail input
η A constant value at the output of an SS trail known
as output or value at the trail output
A Set of a
F Set of A
φ A set of values at the non-trail input known as sample
Φ Set of φ
µx Mean of the random variable x
σ2x Variance of the random variable x
Ta : Φ→ R A mapping from a set of samples to the set of real
numbers for a given value a used for all samples; also
called as statistic T for a fixed fixation
TA : Φ→ R A mapping from a set of samples to the set of real
numbers such that TA (φ) =
∑
a∈A
Ta(φ). For all the
samples φ ∈ Φ, the domain of a remains constant to
A; also called as statistic T for a fixed set of fixation
T : Φ× A→ R A mapping from a set of samples and a set of fixations
to the set of real numbers; also called as statistic T
for a variable fixation
T : Φ×F → R A mapping from a set of samples and a set of sub-
sets of fixations to the set of real numbers such that
T (φ,A) =
∑
a∈A
T (φ, a); also called as statistic T for a
variable set of fixation
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A wide range of cryptanalytic techniques have been developed and applied
on different kinds of information systems throughout the history. This the-
sis work focuses on a specific type of statistical cryptanalysis of symmetric
key cryptosystems. More specifically, it analyses the SSA on a certain kind
of block ciphers. Among the various different kinds of known statistical
cryptanalysis techniques, linear and differential cryptanalysis now have been
quite familiar and even taught in university courses. In addition, different
variants of these techniques namely multidimensional linear (ML), truncated
differential (TD) cryptanalysis have also been invented in the past decades.
Statistical model of the statistics used in these cryptanalytic techniques are
available including their data and time complexities in parallel with their
error probabilities.
The statistics used in the linear and differential cryptanalysis are the correla-
tion of a linear approximation and the differential probability of a plaintext-
ciphertext differential, respectively [4]. Over the past few decades, different
researchers have published links among the statistics of different cryptana-
lytic techniques. Chabaud and Vaudenay have shown that, differential proba-
bilities and squared correlations are linked to each other by Walsh transform
[8]. Blondeau and Nyberg have shown various links between TD and ML
[4, 5]. Although statistical saturation (SS) is a relatively new kind of sta-
tistical cryptanalytic technique proposed by Collard and Standaert [11], few
attempts have already been made by researchers to link SSA with other sta-
tistical cryptanalytic techniques so that the already known statistical mod-
els can be used to apply SSA. Blondeau and Nyberg have shown links in
between TD and SS [5] attacks and have given a model for the SSA based
7
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on the existing model of the TD attack. Leander have shown that there is
a mathematical link between SSA and ML cryptanalysis [13]. However, any
concrete statistical model of SSA is yet to be developed. In this work, instead
of using any link with other statistical cryptanalytic techniques, we look at
SSA directly and develop a statistical model.
As explained in [11], in SSA, the plaintext space is partitioned into two parts.
One part is fixed to a chosen value while the other part iterates over all the
possible values. The ciphertext space is also partitioned into two parts. As
the variable part of the plaintext space iterates over different values, the
distribution of one part of the ciphertext space is observed. If the plaintext
and ciphertext spaces are partitioned considering relevant weakness of the
block cipher then it is possible to gain some insight of the cipher. Because
of this non-uniform distribution of these chosen plaintexts, after a sufficient
number of encryption of them, the one part of the corresponding ciphertexts
also shows non-uniform distribution. The technique to find such a weakness
is a different problem and out of scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, we have
discussed the basic principles of finding such a weakness in the Chapter 2.
However, we mostly focus on how to exploit such a non-uniformity extracted
from the found weakness. In the original paper of Collard and Staendart
[11], they have suggested two approaches to exploit this non-uniformity to
reveal the secret key partially. In the first approach the attacker calculates all
the ciphertext distributions for all possible keys and stores them in a table.
That is, the table stores separate distributions for each key. Then it finds the
distribution from this table that minimizes the distance with the distribution
computed from a secret key. The corresponding key of that distribution in
the table is then assumed to be the secret key. Computing this table is costly
and the second approach solves the problem by introducing a distinguishing
attack using last round trick. If the cipher has r rounds, then the ciphertexts
are partially decrypted through the last round only by all the parital keys.
The key that produces ciphertext distribution which has maximum distance
from uniform distribution is assumed to be a part of the correct key. Indeed,
otherwise any wrong key will make the ciphertext distribution to be more
uniform. We look at this distingushing attack and find a statistic that can be
used to distinguish the ciphertext distribution from random. And then we
also find the model that shows the data complexity, that is, the number of
required plaintext-ciphertext pairs so that the computed statistic can reach
to a value that is able to distinguish the distribution from random with a
significantly low error probability.
The statistic used to analyze this distribution is χ2 distributed which is
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denoted in this thesis by T . Given a T computed from a sample, we apply
a statistical test to identify if T is random or it follows some other known
distribution of a known block cipher. The distribution of the statistic T
for a cipher is then theoretically approximated considering different kinds of
fixations in the plaintext space. It is approximated for any arbitrarily fixed
fixation, for variable fixation, for arbitrarily fixed set of fixations, and for
variable set of fixations.
In Chapter 2, the block cipher and SSA is formally defined. We have dis-
cussed the definition and properties of different kind of statistical distribu-
tions in Chapter 3. The concept of statistical tests that can distinguish an
observed distribution in between two given distributions is also discussed in
this chapter. In Chapter 4 we present the derivations of different T in de-
tail. In Chapter 5, we have derived the data complexity of SSA. Chapter 6
has been dedicated to the experiments that show the validity of the models.
Finally in Chapter 7, we conclude the thesis.
Chapter 2
Block Cipher Cryptanalysis
2.1 Cryptosystem
Definition 2.1.1. [20]A cryptosystem is a five-tuple (P , C,K, E ,D) where
the following conditions are satisfied:
1. P is a finite set of plaintexts;
2. C is a finite set of ciphertexts;
3. K, the keyspace, is a finite set of keys;
4. For each K ∈ K there is an encryption rule eK ∈ E and a corresponding
decryption rule dK ∈ D. Each eK : P → C and dK ∈ D : C → P are
functions such that dK(eK(x)) = x for every plaintext x ∈ P .
That means, a cryptosystem is a set of injective mappings from a finite set of
plaintexts to a finite set of ciphertexts. Each key is associated with exactly
one mapping. When the plaintext and the ciphertext space are equal the
injective mappings are bijective. Figure 2.1 shows a very high level picture
of a cryptosystem. However, in this work, the terms cryptosystem and cipher
have been used interchangeably.
From the key management point of view, cryptosystems can be classified into
two categories. One is public key cryptosystem and the other is symmetric
10
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Plaintexts Ciphertexts
Encryption
Decryption
Keys
Figure 2.1: A basic cryptosystem
key cryptosystem. In public key cryptosystem, the sender encrypts the mes-
sage by the receiver's public key before sending it. The encrypted message
can only be decrypted by the receiver's private key. The security of a public
key cryptosystem depends on some computationally hard problems. Among
many others, such difficult mathematical problems include discrete logarithm
and integer factoring. RSA is a widely known, studied and used public key
cryptosystem that uses the hardness of integer factoring as the basis of its
security. In a symmetric key cryptosystem, both of the sender and the re-
ceiver share the same key which is secret from everyone else. This secret
key is used to both encrypt and decrypt the message. Figures 2.2 and 2.3
give a very high level view of a symmetric and public key cryptosystem. In
both of the figures, Alice is the sender and Bob is the receiver. The security
of such symmetric key cryptosystem primarily depends on its randomness,
size of ciphertext space and key-length. Block ciphers and stream chiphers
are examples of symmetric key cryptosystems. This thesis focuses on block
ciphers.
2.2 Block Cipher
Block cipher is a symmetric key encryption system. The lowest level of
granulairty of the encryption system is a block of bits. That is, the data to
be encrypted is split into blocks xi of fixed length n where i ∈ N. A typical
value of n is 128. And then it encrypts the whole block as a single plaintext
and produce the ciphertext of the same length as the plaintext. Generally it
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Hello Alice Encryption
6EB6957008E0
3CE4
Hello Alice Decryption
Bob
Alice
Secret Key
Figure 2.2: Symmetric key cryptosystem
Hello Alice Encryption
6EB6957008E
03CE4
Hello Alice Decryption
Bob
Alice
Alice’s 
Public Key
Alice’s 
Private Key
Figure 2.3: Public key cryptosystem
can be written as
P = C = Zn2
K = Zl2
For every k ∈ K there exists a bijective mapping Ek : P → C. Generally,
the mapping Ek consists of repetitive applications of same set of operations.
Each repetition is called a round. In each round the cipher often uses a
different key which is called the round key. If a block cipher has r number of
rounds then there will be r number of round keys denoted by k1, ..., kr and
the list of these keys, (k1, ..., kr) is called the key schedule. The round keys
are generated from a master key k by a fixed key generation algorithm. This
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key generation algorithm is public. The first round of the cipher takes the
plaintext as its input. The output of each round is considered as the input
of the next round. The output of the final round is the ciphertext. If we
0W
1W
2W
rNW
3W
g
g
g
g
1k
3k
rNk
1rNW
2k
Figure 2.4: A block cipher
denote the plaintext x by W 0 and the ciphertext Ek(x) = y by W
r and the
round function as g : P ×K → C, then the encryption of a block cipher can
be computed by the Algorithm 1. Figure 2.4 shows the operation pictorially.
Algorithm 1 : E(x, (k1, ..., kr))
W 0 ← x
for i← 1 to r do
W i ← g(W i−1, ki)
end for
return W r
Decryption is applying the inverse of the function g at every round. As we
start from the ciphertext, we have to use the key in the reverse order. That
is, we have to calculate W r−1 = g−1(W r, kr). Note that, g has to be an
injective mapping, otherwise g−1 is not well defined. Using this process, we
can decrypt the cipher by the Algorithm 2. However, based on the detail of
function g and the data structure used to hold the states, there are different
kinds of block ciphers. The simplest one among those is SPN (Substitution-
CHAPTER 2. BLOCK CIPHER CRYPTANALYSIS 14
Algorithm 2 : D(y, (k1, ..., kr))
W r ← y
for i← r to 1 do
W i−1 ← g−1(W i, ki)
end for
return W 0
Permutation Network). In this thesis, SSA is experimented on an SPN named
PRESENT. In the following section SPN is discussed in detail.
2.2.1 Substitution-Permutation Networks
Definition 2.2.1. [19] Let a,m and r be positive integers, let pis : {0, 1}a →
{0, 1}a be a substitution, and let pip : {1, ..., am} → {1, ..., am} be a per-
mutation. Let P = C = {0, 1}am, and let K ⊆ ({0, 1}am)r+1 consist of all
possible key schedules that could be derived from an initial key k using the
key scheduling algorithm. For a key schedule (k1, ..., kr+1), the encryption of
plaintext is computed as Algorithm 3
Algorithm 3 : SPN(x, pis, pip, (k
1, ..., kr+1))
W 0 ← x
for r ← 1 to r − 1 do
ur ← W r−1 ⊕ kr
for i← 1 to m do
vr<i> ← pis(ur<i>)
end for
W r ← (vrpip(1), ..., vrpip(am))
end for
ur ← W r−1 ⊕ kr
for i← 1 to m do
vr<i> ← pis(ur<i>)
end for
y ← vr ⊕ kr+1
return y
Given an am bit binary string, say x = (x1, ..., xam), can be regarded as
the concatenation of m number of a-bit substrings, which can be denoted by
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z 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
piS(z) E 4 D 1 2 F B 8 3 A 6 C 5 9 0 7
Table 2.1: Substitution function piS : {0, 1}4 → {0, 1}4
z 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
piP (z) 1 5 9 13 2 6 10 14 3 7 11 15 4 8 12 16
Table 2.2: Permuation function:piP : {0, 1, ..., 15} → {0, 1, ..., 15}
x<1>, ..., x<m>. Thus
x = x<1>|| · · · ||x<m>
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have that
x<i> = (x(i−1)a+1, ..., xia)
The SPN consists of r rounds. In each round (except for the last round,
which is slightly different), we perform m substitutions using pis, followed by
a permutation using pip. Prior to each substitution operation, we incorporate
the round key bits via a simple XOR operation, this is called round key
mixing. In Algorithm 3, ur is the input to the S-boxes in round r, and vr is
the output of the S-boxes after round r. W r is obtained from vr by applying
the permutation piP , and then u
r+1 is constructed from W r by XOR-ing with
the round key kr+1 . In the last round, the permutation piP is not applied.
Now, we present an SPN as an example.
Example 2.2.1. [19] Suppose that a = m = r = 4. Let piS and piP be defined
by Table 2.1 and 2.2 respectively, where the input of piS are written in hex-
adecimal notation, (0 ↔ (0, 0, 0, 0), 1 ↔ (0, 0, 0, 1), ..., 9 ↔ (1, 0, 0, 1), A ↔
(1, 0, 1, 0), ..., F ↔ (1, 1, 1, 1)).
See Figure 2.5 for a pictorial representation of this particular SPN. In this
diagram, we have named the S-boxes Sri (1 ≤ i, r ≤ 4). All 16 S-boxes
incorporate the same substitution function based on piS.
In order to complete the description of the SPN, we need to specify a key
scheduling algorithm. Here is a simple possibility: suppose that we begin
with a 32-bit key k = (k1, ..., k32) ∈ {0, 1}32. For 1 ≤ r ≤ 5, define kr to
consist of 16 consecutive bits of k, beginning with k4r−3. This may not be
a very secure way to define a key schedule; we have just chosen something
easy for purposes of illustration.
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Figure 2.5: A substitution-permutation network
SPNs have simple and very efficient design, in both hardware and software.
The SPN in Example 2.2.1 is not secure, if for no other reason that the key
length (32 bits) is small enough that an exhaustive key search is feasible.
However, “larger” SPNs can be designed that are secure against all known
attacks. In this work, we use SPN as the test bed of the statistical model of
SSA. As of now, we have defined cryptosystems, block ciphers and SPN. In
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Section 2.3 we have discussed the general philosophy of statistical cryptnal-
ysis of a block cipher and the state of the art in this field of research. Then
we define the SSA formally. In Chapter 4, we start to derive our statistical
model.
2.3 Cryptanalysis
National Security Agency (NSA) has defined cryptanalysis as the analytic
investigation of an information system with the goal of illuminating hidden
aspects of that system. It encompasses any systematic analysis aimed at
discovering features in, understanding aspects of, or recovering hidden pa-
rameters from an information system [1].
This thesis work considers the information system to be a block cipher and
the systematic analysis exploits the statistical properties of the cipher in
question. The process we have followed is broadly known as statistical crypt-
analysis. The process includes finding a statistic (preferably parametrized)
computable from the cipher system which significantly deviates from the
value of the same statistic computed in a uniformly random set up. The pro-
cess also includes the task of finding the parameter that causes the statistic to
deviate the most from random. As the statistic and the parameter is chosen,
the cryptanalysis uses a large set of ciphertexts or plaintext-ciphertext pairs
associated with the cipher in attack to compute the statistic. Comparing the
value of this computed statistic with some known statistic can reveal other
hidden information of the cipher. Depending on the statistic used and the
way it is exploited, there are many different kinds of statistical cryptanaly-
sis. Some of the very well known statistical cryptanalytic techniques include
linear, ML, differential, TD, integral, and SS cryptanalysis.
In linear attacks, the statistic used is the correlation of a linear approxi-
mation. The linear approximation is obtained by applying a mask on the
inputs and a mask on the outputs of the cipher. The correlation of the linear
approximation is calculated by comparing how many times the function out-
puts 1 and how many times it outputs 0. Using this statistic, a cipher can
be distinguished from random and the last round key can also be partially
recovered. Over the years, cryptanalysts have found tricky ways to define
this linear approximation. In ML attack, the linear approximation has mul-
tiple input and output masks. Based on their correlations, the theoretical
distribution of partial plaintext-ciphertext pairs is computed. The input and
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output masks are chosen in a way so that the distribution deviates by large
values from the uniform distribution.
On the other hand, in differential attacks, a different statistic is used. It con-
siders the probability of a differential. That is, it checks the probability of
pairs of plaintexts with some fixed difference to have certain fixed difference
in their corresponding ciphertexts. If a differential is identified for a cipher
which has a significantly different probability than in the random case, then
that differential can be used to reveal other hidden information of the cipher.
In general, the metric used to calculate the difference among the plaintext
pairs and ciphertext pairs is bitwise XOR. Like linear cryptanalysis, dif-
ferential cryptanalysis also has its variants. One such variant is truncated
differential cryptanalysis. In TD attacks, the differential probability consid-
ers only certain bits of plaintexts and ciphertexts while ignoring the other
bits.
In SSA, the statistic of the distribution of ciphertext or plaintext-ciphertext
is considered. Certain bits of the plaintexts are kept fixed while the other bits
can vary. SSA encrypts a large number of such plaintexts and exploits the
distribution of certain bits of the corresponding ciphertexts. In Section 2.4,
SSA is formally explained and in Chapter 4, the derivation of the statistical
model of SSA is presented in detail. However, as Collard and Standaert
applied this attack on the block cipher PRESENT, we also have selected
PRESENT and its small versions [12] as the test bed of SSA. As a result,
before discussing SSA in detail, it will be useful to discuss the specification
of present PRESENT in brief.
2.4 PRESENT
PRESENT is a Substitution-Permutation Network with a block size of 64
bits designed by Bogdanov et al. [6] in 2007. The recommended key size
is 80 bits, which should be sufficient for the expected applications of the
cipher. However, a 128-bit key-schedule is also proposed. The encryption
is composed of 31 rounds. Each of the 31 rounds consists of a non-linear
substitution layer, a linear bitwise permutation layer and a bitwise XOR
operation with round key Ki where 1 ≤ i ≤ 32. Note that, K32 is used
for postwhitening. The non-linear layer uses a single 4-bit S-box which is
applied 16 times in parallel in each round. The linear permutation is defined
by Table 2.3 where bit i of input is moved to bit position P (i). The 4-bit
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Figure 2.6: Top-level algorithmic description of PRESENT [11].
S-box is defined according to Table 2.4. We do not mention the key-schedule
here as we do not make explicit use of it in our distinguishing attack. Figure
2.7 shows the substitution-permutation network pictorially for one round.
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 015 14 13 12 11 10 9 8
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 015 14 13 12 11 10 9 8
Figure 2.7: PRESENT SPN [11].
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i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
p(i) 0 16 32 48 1 17 33 49 2 18 34 50 3 19 35 51
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
p(i) 4 20 36 52 5 21 37 53 6 22 38 54 7 23 39 55
i 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
p(i) 8 24 40 56 9 25 41 57 10 26 42 58 11 27 43 59
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
p(i) 12 28 44 60 13 29 45 61 14 30 46 62 15 31 37 63
Table 2.3: Permutation layer of PRESENT
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S[i] C 5 6 B 9 0 A D 3 E F 8 4 7 1 2
Table 2.4: S-box of PRESENT (hexadecimal notation).
2.5 Non-linearity of the S-box in PRESENT
It is important for any block cipher to be non-linear to be immune against
different kind of cryptanalytic attacks [3, 15]. PRESENT is not an exception.
The S-box in PRESENT is a non-linear function. However, being non-linear
is not a guarantee for the expected security. Cryptanalysts try to find out
linear approximations of the non-linear function with sufficiently deviated
correlation which eventually opens up a weakness of the cipher. A good S-
box is the one which minimizes deviation of the correlations from zero for
all the possible linear approximations. Correlation is a measure of the non-
uniformity of a binary function. Let f : Fn2 → F2 is a boolean function.
Then the correlation of function f denoted by corx (f) is defined in [4] as its
correlation with the all-zero function as following
corx (f) =
1
2n
[# {x ∈ Fn2 | f (x) = 0} −# {x ∈ Fn2 | f (x) 6= 0}] (2.1)
A linear approximation f : Fn2 → F2 of a vectorial boolean function F : Fn2 →
Fn2 is developed by considering an input and an output mask α, β ∈ Fn2 in
the following way
f(α,β) (x) = α · x⊕ β · F (x) (2.2)
where the notation “·” represents standard inner product. The S-box used in
PRESENT is a vectorial boolean function S : F42 → F42 mentioned in Table
2.1. So, given an input mask α ∈ F42 and an output mask β ∈ F42, and
a vectorial boolean function S, the correlation of the linear approximation
f(α,β) = α · x⊕ β · S (x) is measured as follows:
corx
(
f(α,β)
)
=
1
2n
[
#
{
x ∈ Fn2 | f(α,β) (x) = 0
}−#{x ∈ Fn2 | f(α,β) (x) 6= 0}]
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α/β 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
1 0 1
4
0 0 − 1
2
0 − 1
2
0 0 0 0 0 − 1
2
0 1
2
2 0 1
4
1
4
− 1
4
− 1
4
0 0 1
4
− 1
4
0 1
2
0 1
2
− 1
4
1
4
3 0 1
4
1
4
1
4
− 1
4
− 1
2
0 − 1
4
1
4
− 1
2
0 0 0 − 1
4
− 1
4
; 4 0 − 1
4
1
4
− 1
4
− 1
4
0 1
2
− 1
4
− 1
4
0 − 1
2
0 0 − 1
4
1
4
5 0 − 1
4
1
4
− 1
4
1
4
0 0 1
4
1
4
− 1
2
0 1
2
0 1
4
1
4
6 0 0 − 1
4
0 0 − 1
2
0 0 − 1
2
0 0 1
2
0 0 0
7 0 0 1
4
1
2
0 0 0 0 − 1
2
0 0 0 0 1
2
0
8 0 1
4
− 1
4
0 0 − 1
4
1
4
− 1
4
1
4
0 0 − 1
4
1
4
1
2
1
2
9 1
2
− 1
4
− 1
4
0 0 1
4
− 1
4
− 1
4
− 1
4
− 1
2
0 − 1
4
1
4
0 0
A 0 1
2
0 1
4
1
4
0 − 1
4
1
4
0 0 − 1
2
1
4
1
4
− 1
4
1
4
B − 1
2
0 0 − 1
4
− 1
4
1
4
− 1
4
− 1
4
0 0 0 1
4
1
4
1
4
− 1
4
C 0 0 0 − 1
4
− 1
4
− 1
4
− 1
4
1
4
0 0 − 1
2
− 1
4
1
4
1
4
− 1
4
D 1
2
1
2
0 − 1
4
− 1
4
1
4
1
4
0 0 0 0 1
4
− 1
4
1
4
− 1
4
E 0 1
4
1
4
− 1
2
1
2
− 1
4
− 1
4
− 1
4
− 1
4
0 0 − 1
4
− 1
4
0 0
F 1
4
1
4
1
4
0 0 − 1
4
− 1
4
− 1
4
1
4
− 1
2
0 1
4
1
4
0 0
Table 2.5: Correlation table of S-box of PRESENT: corx
(
f(α,β)
)
The correlation table of the S-box of PRESENT is given in Table 2.5 [10].
We have discussed how this table helps in preparing an SSA in Section 2.7. In
Chapter 6, we have shown in detail how this table helps in finding a feasible
SSA attack on SMALLPESENT-[n].
2.6 SSA
SSA is a chosen plaintext attack. It means the attacker has access to an
encryption oracle and can encrypt any plaintext without knowing the en-
cryption key. As the idea of SSA has already been mentioned in the in-
troduction, we will now define it formally and discuss the basic principle of
finding a weakness in a block cipher to mount an SSA.
Let the length of the input and the output block of the SPN is n. Then
the set of plaintexts and ciphertexts can be considered as a set of vectors of
length n defined over the field F2, that is Fn2 . Let xi denote the i-th element
of the vector x ∈ Fn2 . As the assumed weakness of the cipher suggests, we find
four integers s, t, q r such that s+ t = q + r = n and Bs, Bt, Bq, Br ⊆ [n] are
subsets of all the possible bit positions. |Bs| = s, |Bt| = t, |Bq| = q, |Br| = r
and Bs ∩Bt = Bq ∩Br = ∅ and |Bs ∪Bt| = |Bq ∪Br| = ∅.
That is, the bit positions are partitioned into two disjoint parts in possibly
two different ways. Then the plaintexts are chosen in a way so that the bits in
positions Bs are kept fixed while the bits in positions Bt vary. In this fashion,
sufficiently large number of plaintexts are chosen and encrypted. Then from
all the ciphertext achieved from this process is observed by focusing only
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on the bits in Bq. The distribution of the bits in Bq is supposed to be
non-uniform enough to be used in a statistical test given that the plaintext
and chiphertext space partition has been done based on a weakness. In this
scenario, the sets Bs and Bq form what is called an SS trail. We call Bs as
the input and Bq as the output of the trail.
2.7 Constructing an SS trail for PRESENT
The strenght of an SSA depends on the non-uniformity of the the distribution
at the output of the trail associated with the attack. In an SPN, in every
round, apart from the key mixing, there are two layers. One is the non-
linear layer which is called the sBoxLayer and the other is the linear layer
called pLayer. The target is to choose certain bits from the plaintext space
of the cipher so that they are strongly correlated with certain other bits
in the ciphertext space across the sBoxLayer and pLayer of all the rounds
under consideration. Then those strongly correlated bits in the plaintext and
ciphertext space will form a useful SS trail.
One way to find such correlations is to select a set of input and output bits
(from the round function of the SPN) for the trail in such a way that the
output bits of every round will after the permutation be the input bits of the
next round.
Now if we encrypt many plaintexts by ensuring extreme non-uniformity in
those input bits at the very first round (in other words, fixing those input
bits in the plaintext space), then because of the bijective property of the
S-box, there will be some degree of non-uniformity in the output bits of the
selected S-box. In addition, because of the correlation among the selected
input and output bits of the S-box, there will also be a certain level of non-
uniformity in the chosen output bits of the first round. As the selection of
the bits is made in a way that the selected output bits of the round function
is permuted only among the input bit positions, the distribution of the input
bits of the next round will also remain non-uniform. In this fashion, after r
number of rounds, the output bits will remain non-uniform to certain degree.
And thus the chosen input and output bits define the trail. However, the
non-uniformity decreases as the number of rounds increases. So, naturally a
good SS trail is the one which provides useful non-uniformity in the chosen
output bits even after a significantly large value of r.
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An S-box is a bijective function from a set of binary vectors to a set of binary
vectors. As this is a bijection, applying non-uniformity in the inputs of an
S-box will also produce non-uniformity in its output. Let the non-uniformity
of the inputs of an S-box is generated by making only one specific input bit
non-uniform. Let this specific input bit is xi. Then such non-uniformity
in the input will generate non-uniformity in those output bits yj which has
non-zero correlation with xi. If for i 6= j, two input bits xi, xj has non-zero
correlation with output bit yk, then the non-uniformity of yk achieved by the
non-uniformity of both of the bits xi and xj is higher than the non-uniformity
achieved by the non-uniformity of only one of xi or xj.
This suggests that, the input and output bits of the trail should be chosen
in such a way that the number of input bits are maximized in one S-box.
However, this also forces the number of output bits to be maximized in one
S-box because the chosen output bits of one round become the chosen input
bits of the next round. Note that if a chosen input bit xi of an S-box has zero
correlation with a chosen output bit yj of the same S-box, then applying non-
uniformity on xi doesn’t produce any non-uniformity on yj. This suggests
to avoid choosing any pair of input-output bits from the same S-box which
have zero correlation accross that S-box.
2.7.1 SS trails in PRESENT
Let us visualize the S-box in PRESENT as shown in Figure 2.8. The leftmost
input bit x0 is considered as the least significant bit. By observing Table 2.5,
we find that input bit x0 has zero correlation with all the output bits yi where
0 ≤ i ≤ 3. We also find that input bit x3 has zero correlation with output
bit y2. The 1 bit trails in case of zero correlations are marked using the red
lines. As a result a good SS trail should include the bits from every S-box
in a way that x0 is not included at all and x3, y2 are not present in the trail
simultaneously.
There is a weakness in the permutation layer of PRESENT as described
in Figure 2.9 [11]. The size of a block is n = 64. Counting the plaintext
bits starting from 0 from the right, the 21, 22, 25, 26, 37, 38, 41, 42 bits are
active only in 4 S-boxes. And none of these bits are x0, x3 or y2. So, it
is expected that if we fix these 8 bits (extreme non-uniformity) for each
plaintext that we encrypt, then after encrypting sufficiently large amount
of plaintexts, the ciphertexts will also have non-uniformity in the same 8
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Figure 2.8: 1 bit trails in the S-box of PRESENT.
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Figure 2.9: Weakness in PRESENT [11].
bits. That is, the evolution of these 8 bits are not random enough. As a
result, we have a partitioning of the plaintext and ciphertext space. In the
partitioning s = q = 8, t = r = 56, Bs = Bq = {21, 22, 25, 26, 37, 38, 41, 42}
and Bt = Br = {0, 1, ..., 63} \Bs.
Another interesting SS trail is mentioned in Figure 2.10. This trail has 27
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bits at its input and 27 bits at its output. There are 9 active S-boxes. Every
S-box has 3 input and 3 output bits. That means in every S-box there are
3× 3 = 9 different 1 bit to 1 bit trail. Note that this SS trail includes x3, y2
simultaneously which is unlike the principle we discussed in previous section.
The reason, it is still a good SS trail is, out of the 9 trails in every S-box,
x3, y2 bits are involved in only one of them simultaneously. This results into
8 active trails in every S-box whereas by excluding both of them we could
have at most 2×2 = 4 active trails in every S-box. That means, even though
x3, y2 has zero correlation among them across the S-box, it is still useful to
include them in a trail as they contribute in generating other active trails.
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 015 14 13 12 11 10 9 8
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 015 14 13 12 11 10 9 8
Figure 2.10: Weakness in PRESENT [11].
2.8 Exploiting the Weakness
In [11], the authors proposed two techniques to exploit the weakness. In
both of the techniques a sufficient number of chosen plaintexts are encrypted
where xs part of x is fixed to a value a.
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2.8.1 Comparing with Model Distribution
In order to exploit this weakness, the model distribution of yq part of y is
evaluated by Algorithm 4 for each key guess. For one key guess at each
round, the work needed to compute the model distribution of the target trail
after r round is equivalent to r · 216 partial encryptions. Once the model
distributions are computed, the key of the model distribution that minimizes
the distance with the distribution computed from a secret key is accepted to
be the correct key.
Algorithm 4 : Computing model distribution
1: Input: 8-bit subkey guess sk and the 8-bit input distribution
distrib in[256]
2: Output: the 8-bit output distribution distrib out[256]
3:
4: initialize distrib out[256] to the all-zero state
5: for 8-bit values text do
6: for 8-bit values rand do
7: fix the 8-bit trail to text and xor with sk
8: fix the 8-bit non-trail to rand
9: apply the S-boxes
10: apply the permutation
11: evaluate the value of the 8 bit trail out
12: update distrib out[out] = distrib out[out] + distrib in[text]/256;
13: end for
14: end for
To verify the practicability of the attack model, Collard and Standaert have
conducted an experiment on reduced-round version of PRESENT. To reduce
the number of key guess, they have simplified the key scheduling algorithm
by using the same key in each round. They have used 230 chosen plaintexts.
In all those plaintexts, the 8 bits (mentioned in Figure 2.9 in bold lines) are
fixed, and the other 56 bits are varied. All those plaintexts are encrypted
where round keys are kept fixed in each round. Then they have computed
the distribution of those fixed 8 bits at the end of 2, 4, 6 and 8 round. These
experimental distributions computed from the real cipher itself with reduced-
round and modified key scheduling algorithm is compared with the model
distributions computed from Algorithm 4 for 2, 4, 6 and 8 rounds. According
to this simplified experiment, both experimental and model distributions
present a significant deviation from uniform as expected.
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They also have made an observation on the distance in between the experi-
mental and model distributions. First they have computed the experimental
and model distributions of the concerned 8 bits at the end of 2, 4, 6 and 8
rounds for the key byte 32 (i.e. 00100000). Then they have computed the
model distributions of these 8 bits for all possible 256 sub-keys at the end
of 2, 4, 6 and 8 rounds. Finally they have plotted the distance in between
the model distribution for every possible key bytes and model disribution
of key byte 32. For the sake of discussion, let us call this distance to be
model-model distance. They also have plotted the distance in between the
model distribution for every possible key bytes and experimental disribution
of key byte 32. Let us call this distance to be model-experiment distance.
It has been found that the distance between the model-model and model-
experiment distance is minimized at the correct key. This indicates that the
model distribution captures the essence of the experimental distribution.
In both of the experiments it has been found that the deviation tends to
decrease with number of rounds. So, as the number of rounds increases, to
find significant deviation, the number of chosen plaintext is also needed to
be increased. In other words, as the number of rounds increases, the data
complexity of the attack also increases.
However, in the attack mentioned above, the effect of the key scheduling
algorithm has been ignored to show that the basic idea works in principle.
Now considering the key scheduling algorithm, demands more key bits to be
guessed as the round key changes in every round. As for one round we need
to guess at most 8 bits, we are in need of guessing at most r × 8 bits after r
rounds. According to Collard and Standaert, for 12 rounds of PRESENT, 63
key bits have to be guessed, meaning, there are 263 different possible keys in
effect. For each key guess, after r rounds, we are in need of computing r×216
partial encryptions. Which implies that we are in need of 263×r×216 partial
encryptions. We see that the attack becomes quite impossible even with 12
rounds because of its time complexity. In the next section, we present a
tricky way to overcome this problem. The idea is the same as in commonly
used statistical linear and differential attacks. Instead of guessing key bits
on the intermediate rounds, make a prediction about the behaviour of the
cipher over those rounds that holds on the average over the keys.
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2.8.2 Distinguishing Attack:
Computing the theoretical distribution is costly. To overcome this problem,
they suggest a distinguishing attack which we will explain in brief here. The
plaintexts are encrypted using r-rounds of PRESENT and record the distri-
bution of the ciphertexts for the 16 bits at the output of the 4 active S-box
in the last round. Given this experimental distribution, it is possible to com-
pute the output distribution of the target 8-bit trail one round before by
a classical partial decryption process. For one key guess, the evaluation of
such r − 1-round distribution requires 216 computations. For the corect key
guess, the experimental 8-bit distribution in the r−1-round is expected to be
more non-uniform than for any other guess. This is because decrypting with
a wrong guess is expected to have the same effect as encrypting one more
round. Thus it is expected to distinguish the correct key from the wrong
ones by computing the distance between a partially decrypted distribution
and the uniform distribution. If the attack works properly, the distribution
with the highest distance should correspond to the correct key.
There are extensions of this distinguishing attack. The same attack can be
made by increasing the number of fixed plaintext bits or by using multiple
fixations of the fixed bits or by doing partial decryption for 2 rounds instead
of 1 round. However, all these extensions require to distinguish a distribution
from uniform distribution. The statistical model developed in this work is a
statistic T which can be used to perform a statistical test that can distinguish
the computed distribution in between two known distributions. In the next
sections, we have defined formally the notion of a distribution. We will also
recall some known distributions and their properties as they will be useful
in finding the statistical model. In the next chapter we have presented how
to perform a statistical test to distinguish a distribution between two given
distributions. In the next chapter we have defined the statistic T and used
it to develop a SS distinguisher in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we have shown
how the success probability of the statistical test is related with the number
of plaintexts we encrypt before performing the statistical test.
Chapter 3
Statistics
3.1 Probability Distribution
Probability distribution is a function from a set of possible outcomes of an
experiment to a set of real values in the range [0, 1]. The sum of the prob-
abilities of occurrences of all the possible outcomes is always 1. Now if the
set of possible outcomes contains only discrete values then the function that
defines the probability distribution is called probability mass function (pmf).
If the set of possible outcomes contains continuous value within any range,
then the function that defines the probability distribution of the experiment
is called probability density function (pdf).
There are different kinds of probability density and probability mass func-
tions that describes the probability distribution of many natural events. Few
of these probability distributions have been found to be very important in
developing the statistical model of SSA. In this section those distributions
along with their properties are discussed briefly
3.1.1 Gamma Distribution
Definition 3.1.1. [17] A random variable X that is gamma-distributed with
shape k and scale θ is denoted by
X ∼ Γ(k, θ) ≡ Gamma(k, θ)
29
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The probability density function using the shape-scale parametrization is
f(x; k, θ) =
xk−1e−
x
θ
θkΓ(k)
for x > 0 and k, θ > 0
Here Γ(k) is the gamma function evaluated at k.
Figure 3.1 provides a visualization of the gamma distribution given different
shape and scale parameters.
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Figure 3.1: Gamma distribution with different shape and scale parameters
3.1.2 Properties of Gamma Distribution
1. Let X be a random variable which is gamma distributed with shape
parameter k and scale parameter θ. Then for any constant c, the
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random variable Y = cX is also gamma distributed with the shape
parameter k
′
and scale parameter θ
′
. Where k
′
= k and θ
′
= cθ [21].
In other words, we can write
X ∼ Γ(k, θ)⇒ cX ∼ Γ(k, cθ) (3.1)
2. Le X be a random variable which is gamma distributed with the shape
parameter k and scale parameter θ. Then the mean and variance of X
denoted by µX and σ
2
X respectively are defined as follows [17]
µX = kθ (3.2)
σ2X = kθ
2 (3.3)
3.1.3 χ2-Distribution
[7] In probability theory and statistics, the chi-squared distribution (also chi-
square or χ2-distribution) with k degrees of freedom is the distribution of a
sum of the squares of k + 1 independent standard normal random variables.
The probability density function of the chi-squared distribution is
f(x; k) =
{
x(k/2−1)e−x/2
2k/2Γ( k2 )
, x ≥ 0;
0, otherwise.
(3.4)
where Γ(k/2) denotes the Gamma function, which has closed-form values
for integer k. In addition to these, the concept of central and non-central
χ2-distributions, their means and variances will be useful in deriving the sta-
tistical model. Figure 3.2 shows how the probability density function looks
for different values of k
Definition 3.1.2. [14] Let Xi ∼ N (µi, σ2i ) where i = 0, ..., k. Then the
random variable
T0 =
k∑
i=0
(Xi − µi)2
σ2i
(3.5)
has central χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom which is written as
T0 ∼ χ2k (3.6)
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Figure 3.2: Chi-square distribution with different parameters
and the random variable
T1 =
k∑
i=0
(Xi)
2
σ2i
(3.7)
has non-central χ2-distribution with k degrees of freedom where the non-
centrality parameter is
δ =
k∑
1=0
µ2i
σ2i
(3.8)
And this is written as:
T1 ∼ χ2k(δ) (3.9)
CHAPTER 3. STATISTICS 33
The mean and variance of the variable T0 which is centrally χ
2-distributed
are following:
µT0 = k (3.10)
σ2T0 = 2k (3.11)
And the mean and variance of the variable T1 which is non-centrally χ
2-
distributed with δ as non-central parameter is following:
µT1 = k + δ (3.12)
σ2T1 = 2(k + 2δ) (3.13)
3.1.4 Link Between χ2 and Γ Distribution
A χ2 variable X of k degrees of freedom is gamma distributed with shape
α = k
2
and scale β = 2 [18]. That is
X ∼ χ2k ⇒ X ∼ Γ (α = k/2, β = 2) (3.14)
3.1.5 Normal approximation of χ2 distribution:
[23] For large number of degrees of freedom k, the chi-square distribution
may be approximated by a normal distribution. Consequently we have the
following two approximations.
1. For a sufficiently large value of k, a central χ2-distributed random vari-
able X with k degrees of freedom is approximately normally distributed
X ∼ N (k, 2k) (3.15)
2. For a sufficiently large value of k, a non-central χ2-distributed random
variable X with k degrees of freedom and δ as non-centrality parameter
is approximately normally distributed
X ∼ N (k + δ, 2 (k + 2δ)) (3.16)
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3.1.6 Normal approximation of Γ Distribution
Let the shape and scale parameters of a gamma distribution be α and β.
Asymptotically, given that for a shape parameter α, going to infinity, a
gamma distribution converges towards a normal distribution with expecta-
tion µ = α · β and variance σ2 = αβ2 [22].
3.1.7 Binomial Distribution
As defined in [9], the binomial distribution with parameters n and θ is the
discrete probability distribution of the number of successes in a sequence
of n independent “yes/no” experiments, each of which yields success with
probability θ. The probability of getting exactly k successes in n trials is
given by the probability mass function
f(k;n, θ) = Pr(X = k) =
(
n
k
)
θk(1− θ)n−k (3.17)
for k = 0, 1, 2, ..., n, where
(
n
k
)
= n!
k!(n−k)! is the binomial coefficient, hence the
name of the distribution.
Let N be the number of data (sample size), M be the number of cells with
different probabilities p(η), η = 1, 2, ...,M . Now if ω(η) denotes the number
of data in cell η, then ω(η) ∼ B(p(η)). As mentioned in [14], for large N we
have
ω(η) ∼ N (Np(η), Np(η)) ≈ N (Np(η), N/M) (3.18)
3.2 Capacity
3.2.1 Capacity of a Distribution
Given a function f : X → Y , x ∈ X, η ∈ Y , and X is uniformly distributed,
the probability of f(x) = η is denoted by pη defined as
pη = |X|−1#{x ∈ X | f(x) = η} (3.19)
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The probability distribution of the function f is described by the pmf p =
(pη). The uniformity of a distribution p is measured by its capacity, also
called as Squared Euclidean Imbalance. Capacity of a distribution is com-
puted from its squared distance from the uniform distribution. If the capacity
of a distribution p is denoted by Cp, then it can be formally written as
Cp = |Y |
∑
η∈Y
(pη − |Y |−1)2 (3.20)
Let p(a) = (pη(a)) denote a probability distribution over domain Y in a fam-
ily of distributions parametrized by a ∈ I. We consider a as a uniformly
distributed random variable. We assume that this family of probability dis-
tributions satisfies the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. For each fixed η ∈ Y , the probability pη(a) is a random
variable and independently distributed and follow the normal distribution
pη(a) ∼ N
(
µ, σ2
)
where µ = |Y |−1
For an arbitrarily fixed a, the capacity of p(a) = (pη (a)) is denoted by C(a).
Then
C (a) = |Y |
∑
η∈Y
(pn (a)− |Y |−1)2 (3.21)
The average capacity over the parametrized probability distributions p(a) is
defined by
C = |I|−1
∑
a∈I
C(a) (3.22)
3.2.2 Distribution of Capacity
Theorem 3.2.1. Given a family p(a), a ∈ I of probability distributions that
satisfies Hypothesis 1, the capacity C(a) is gamma distributed
C(a) ∼ Γ
( |Y | − 1
2
,
2C
|Y | − 1
)
with mean C and variance 2C
2
|Y |−1
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Proof. Let µC(a) and σ
2
C(a) denote the mean and variance of C(a) respectively.
According to (3.22) we have µC(a) = C. Let us now examine the parametrized
statistic Q(a) defined as
Q(a) =
∑
η
(
pη(a)− µpη(a)
)2
σ2pη(a)
(3.23)
From Hypothesis 1, we know that pη(a) is identically and independently
normally distributed. As a result, using Hypothesis 1 and Definition 3.1.2,
we can write
Q (a) =
∑
η
(pη(a)− |Y |−1)2
σ2
∼ χ2|Y |−1 (3.24)
Let us multiply both sides of (3.24) by the cardinality of the set Y and
variance of the distribution pη(a). The result is following:
|Y |Q(a)σ2 = |Y |
∑
η
(
pη(a)− |Y |−1
)2
(3.25)
As per definition of capacity of a distribution given in (3.20), the right hand
side of (3.25) is the capacity of the distribution p(a), which can be denoted
as C(a) as per our convention. So, we get
C(a) = |Y |σ2Q(a)
Now if we plug (3.24) in (3.14), then we can write
Q(a) ∼ Γ
( |Y − 1|
2
, 2
)
(3.26)
We see |Y | is a constant and as per Hypothesis 1, σ2 is also a constant.
According to (3.26), Q(a) is gamma distributed. So, as per the property of
gamma distribution given in (3.1), we can write
C(a) ∼ Γ
( |Y − 1|
2
, 2|Y |σ2
)
(3.27)
Let us denote the mean of C(a) over all a ∈ I by C. As per the property of
gamma distribution given in (3.2) the mean of the gamma distributed random
variable is the multiplication of its shape and scale parameter. Consequently,
from (3.27), the mean C is as follows
C = |Y − 1||Y |σ2
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Which implies that
σ2 =
C
|Y − 1||Y | (3.28)
Now by plugging the σ2 from (3.28) in (3.27), we obtain the following result
C(a) ∼ Γ
( |Y | − 1
2
,
2C
|Y | − 1
)
(3.29)
The first claim of the theorem is now proven and it remains to show that the
variance is σ2C(a) =
2C2
Y−1 . As per the property of gamma distribution given in
(3.3), variance of a gamma distributed variable is the multiplication of it’s
shape parameter and the square of scale parameter. Using this property in
(3.29), we find the variance σ2C(a) as follows
σ2C(a) =
|Y − 1|
2
(
2C
|Y − 1|
)2
=
2C2
|Y | − 1
3.3 A statistical test to distinguish distribu-
tion
In the applications of cryptanalysis, the task is to distinguish between ci-
pher and random behavior based on an observed distribution computed from
sample data. Now we present a statistical test to accomplish this task. To
perform the statistical test, we are in need of a statistic computed from the
cipher data distribtuion. We denote this statistic as T . For the statistical
test we are presenting here, it is essential for T to be defined in a way that
it is normally distributed. Suppose we already know two normal deviates T0
and T1 such that
T0 ∼ N
(
µT0 , σ
2
T0
)
T1 ∼ N
(
µT1 , σ
2
T1
)
and assuming without loss of generality that µT0 < µT1 . Given a T computed
from a sample about which we know that it follows either the distribution of
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T0 or T1. The task is to decide which of those two it is. The test is defined
by a value τ . If T ≤ τ the outcome of the test is that T is drawn from the
distribution of T0 and if T > τ then T is drawn from the distribution T1.
The error probabilities are defined as
α0 = Pr (T0 | T > τ)
α1 = Pr (T1 | T ≤ τ)
That is, α0 is the probability that the test outputs T1 when the reality is T0.
Similarly α1 is the probablity that the test outputs T0 when the reality is
T1. To make the error probabilities less than α0 and α1, we must select τ to
satisfy
µT0 + σT0ζ0 ≤ τ ≤ µT1 − σT1ζ1 (3.30)
where Φ(ζi) = 1−αi for i ∈ Z2 for the cumulative distribution function Φ of
the standard normal distribution. That is, ζi indicates how many standard
deviation beyond the mean is required to bound the probability of wrongly
choosing Ti−1 by at most αi. The Figure 3.3 shows the range of feasible
values of τ . In Figure 3.4 shows how to choose a single value of τ . Note
that in Figure 3.4, the area on the right side of the yellow line under the red
curve indicates α0 and the area on the left side of the yellow line under the
blue curve indicates α1 In the applications of cryptanalysis the distribution
of T1 is determined by the cipher while T0 represents random behaviour. If
the cipher distribution has non-zero capacity the statistic T given above can
be used. The parameters of T1 depend on the number N of plaintexts, while
the parameters of T0 are constant with N as the distribution is uniform and
its capacity is equal to zero. Then the distributions of T0 and T1 move apart
as N grows. The phenomenon is presented in Figure 3.5. In this figure, the
blue line has moved on the right along the X-axis, which has made the error
areas smaller. Then the above equation allows to determine the sample size
N which is sufficient to find a threshold τ that gives a test with as small
non-zero error probabilities α0 and α1 as desired.
In Section 3.4, we have defined statistic T which we have used to develop the
statistical model in the Chapter 4.
3.4 Statistic T for the statistical test
We already have mentioned that statistic T is computed from cipher data
distribution. Note that the cipher data is computed from a set of chosen
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Figure 3.3: Choosing a range of feasible values of τ
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Figure 3.4: Choosing a single value of τ . That is µ0 + σ0ζ0 = µ1 − σ1ζ1
plaintexts. Let us call this set of chosen plaintexts as sample denoted by φ.
Let us consider a fuction Ω : φ → Y derived from the encryption function.
Let ω : Y → Z another function such that ω (η) is the number of times a
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Figure 3.5: As T0, T1 move apart, τ can be chosen for smaller error rate
value η ∈ Y is observed as the output of function Ω, that is
ω (η) = # {x ∈ φ | Ω (x) = η} , η ∈ Y
Now given a sample φ of size N , we define T as following:
T =
∑
η∈Y
(ω(η)−N |Y |−1)2
N |Y |−1
In sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we have discussed how the statistic T is distributed
when the sample φ is sampled with or without replacement.
3.4.1 Sampling with replacement
Let pη denote the expected probability of getting Ω(x) = η when N = 1.
We also observe that that ω(η) is binomially distributed. As per property of
binomial distribution given in (3.18) we can write
µω(η) = Npη (3.31)
σ2ω(η) = N |Y |−1 (3.32)
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Now, according to the definition of χ2-distribution given in (3.9), the statistic
T =
∑
η∈Y
(ω(η)−N |Y |−1)2
N |Y |−1
=
∑
η∈Y
(ω(η)−N |Y |−1)2
σ2ω(η)
=
∑
η∈Y
(ω(η)−N |Y |−1)2
σ2ω(η)−N |Y |−1
is non-centrally χ2|Y |−1(δ)-distributed. To calculate the the non-central pa-
rameter δ, we need to know the mean and variance of ω(η) − N |Y |−1. Ob-
serve that N |Y |−1 is a constant and the mean of ω(η) is Npη. Consequently
the mean of ω(η) − N |Y |−1 is Npη − N |Y |−1. And variance of ω(η) and
ω(η)−N |Y |−1 are same. As a result we can calculate δ as following
δ =
∑
η∈Y
(Npη −N |Y |−1)2
σ2ω(η)−N |Y |−1
=
∑
η∈Y
N2 (pη − |Y |−1)2
N |Y |−1
= N
∑
η∈Y
(pη − |Y |−1)2
|Y |−1
= NC
Where C is the capacity of the distribution p = (pη). Now according to
Definition 3.1.2, the mean and variance of T , denote by µT and σ
2
T are
µT = |Y | − 1 +NC
σ2T = 2 (|Y | − 1 + 2NC)
According to the normal approximation of χ2-distribution as mentioned in
Section 3.1.5 we can write
T ∼ N (|Y | − 1 +NC, 2 (|Y | − 1 + 2NC)) (3.33)
3.4.2 Sampling without replacement
When φ is sampled without replacement, the number of different possible
samples decreases as the size of the samples increases. The difference between
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those different samples also decreases as the size of the samples increases.
Which implies, as the sample size grows, the value of T also differs small
for different samples. As a result, the variance of T decreases. This is
indeed, because when we consider the maximum sample size, there is only one
possible sample and only one possible value of T resulted from this sample.
Which means, in this case T has zero variance. This phenomenon has been
taken into account by Blondeau and Nyberg in [2]. They have introduced a
co-efficient B in the computation of the mean and variance of T using sample
without replacement. When the sample size is small, B is almost one and as
the sample size grows towards the maximum size, B approaches to zero and
becomes zero when the sample size is maximum.
According to [2], we can define B as
(
1− N|φ|max
)
. Here |φ|max is the largest
possible size of a valid sample φ. And the mean and variance of T are
following:
µT = (|Y | − 1)B +NC (3.34)
σ2T = 2 (|Y | − 1)B2 + 4BNC (3.35)
In the next chapter we have extended this discussion of T considering the
associated trail of the attack. That is, we have defined the function Ω con-
sidering the the encryption function and the SS trail. However, we will only
focus on the case of sampling with replacement in the rest of the thesis. Sam-
pling with replacement is already good enough, in real life cryptanalysis. As
shown in [2], the method of sampling without replacement offers some ad-
vantage when the sample size is close to the full codebook. In an upcoming
paper [16] the statistical model developed in this work has been extended to
the case of sampling without replacement.
Chapter 4
Statistical Distinguishers
In previous chapter we have discussed how to exploit the weakness of a
cipher in SSA. Now we know that, to exploit the weakness of a block cipher
by SSA, we need to be able to distinguish a distribution from random. It
was shown how a statistical test can accomplish this task. We also have
explained that we need a statistic to perform the statistical test and have
defined the statistic that we have used in the test. While defining the statistic
T in previous chapter we have introduced two function Ω and ω but have not
exactly defined them. In this chapter we define the statistic T specifically by
defining the exact mapping of Ω and ω .
In the SSA introduced by Collard and Standaert [11], a part of the plaintext
is fixed and the distribution of a part of the ciphertext is observed. Let the
plaintext be
x = (xs, xt) ∈ Fs2 × Ft2
and the ciphertext
y = E(x,K) = (yq, yr) ∈ Fq2 × Fr2
We fix the xs part of the plaintexts to different values and observe the dis-
tribution of yq part. We can define the functions Ω and ω differently based
on how xs is fixed. In the following sections we will derive different distribu-
tions of the statistics T defined differently, based on different variants of the
functions Ω and ω.
43
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4.1 Model For One Fixation
We find the distribution of the statistic depending on the way the fixation
is chosen. First, we derive the distribution for a given fixation a and then
we go for general case of any fixation a ∈ F2s. For a fixed a ∈ Fs2 such that
x = (a, xt) and K ∈ Fl2 the vectorial boolean function under consideration is
Ωa : φ→ Fq2 where Ωa(xt) = yq (4.1)
where y = E ((a, xt) , K) = (yq, yr) and φ ⊆ Ft2 is sampled randomly with
replacement. We also define another integer function ωa : Fq2 → Z such that
for a given η ∈ Fq2
ωa (η) = # {Ωa (xt) = η | xt ∈ φ} (4.2)
4.1.1 Arbitrarily Fixed Fixation
For a fixed fixation a and any sample φ ⊆ Ft2 such that |φ| = N ≤ 2t, the
statistic T is denoted by Ta(φ) and defined as
Ta(φ) =
2q−1∑
η=0
(ωa(η)−N2−q)2
N2−q
(4.3)
We see that ωa(η) is binomially distributed. So, according to (3.18), we can
write
ωa(η) ∼ N
(
µωη(a), σ
2
ωη(a)
)
where µωa(η) = Npη(a) and σ
2
ωa(η)
= N2−q. Then the random variable
Xa(η) = ωa(η)−N2−q is also approximately normally distributed
Xa(η) ∼ N (µXa(η), σ2Xa(η))
where µXa(η) = µωa(η) −N2−q and σ2Xa(η) = σ2ωa(η). Now we can write
Ta(φ) =
2q−1∑
η=0
(Xa(η))
2
N2−q
=
2q−1∑
η=0
(Xa(η))
2
σ2Xa(η)
=
2q−1∑
η=0
(Xa(η))
2
σ2Xa(η)
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Then by Definition 3.1.2 we can write
Ta(φ) ∼ χ22q−1(δ(a)) (4.4)
where χ22q−1(δ(a)) is the non-central χ
2 distribution with 2q − 1 degrees of
freedom and non-central parameter
δ(a) =
2q−1∑
η=0
(µXa(η))
2
σ2Xa(η)
=
2q−1∑
η=0
(µωa(η) − σ2ωa(η))2
σ2ωa(η)
=
2q−1∑
η=0
(Npη(a)−N2−q)2
N2−q
= NC(a)
Then by Definition 3.1.2, for each fixed a the mean µTa(φ) and variance σ
2
Ta(φ)
of Ta(φ), as the sample of size N varies, are
µTa(φ) = 2
q − 1 +NC(a)
σ2Ta(φ) = 2(2
q − 1 + 2NC(a))
By the normal approximation of χ2 distribution as given in (3.16), we can
write:
Ta(φ) ∼ N (µTa(φ), σ2Ta(φ))
Ta(φ) ∼ N (2q − 1 +NC(a), 2(2q − 1 + 2NC(a)) (4.5)
4.1.2 Variable Fixation
By Theorem 3.2.1, for any arbitrarily fixed fixation a ∈ Fs2, the capacity of
the distribution p(a) denoted by C(a) is
C(a) ∼ Γ
( |Y | − 1
2
,
2C
|Y | − 1
)
where we have assumed that p (a) satisfies Hypothesis 1. According to the
property of gamma distribution as given in 3.2 and 3.3, the mean and variance
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of C (a) over all possible a is C and 2C
2
|Y |−1 respectively. According to the link
in between gamma and normal distribution given in Section 3.1.6 we get
C(a) ∼ N
(
C,
2C2
|Y | − 1
)
(4.6)
We can derive the mean µNC(a) and variance σ
2
NC(a) of NC(a).
µNC(a) = NµC(a) = NC
σ2NC(a) = N
2σ2C(a) = N
2 2C
2
|Y | − 1 =
2(NC)2
|Y | − 1
That implies
NC(a) ∼ N
(
NC,
2(NC)2
|Y | − 1
)
(4.7)
We denote by T (φ, a) the statistic Ta (φ) where fixation a also varies in the
same way sample φ of size N varies. Then we have the following result.
Theorem 4.1.1. Let us assume that sample φ of size N ≤ 2t drawn randomly
with replacement with a fixed key and fixation a of s bits of the plaintext
and the number q of observed bits in the ciphertext is sufficiently large. If
p (a) satisfies Hypothesis 1, then T (φ, a) is approximately normal with mean
µT (φ,a) and variance σ
2
T (φ,a), where
µT (φ,a) = 2
−s∑
a∈Fs2
µTa(φ) = 2
q − 1 +NC
σ2T (φ,a) =
2
2q − 1 (2
q − 1 +NC)2
Proof. For each fixed a and variable sample φ of size N , according to (4.5)
we have
Ta(φ) ∼ N (2q − 1 +NC(a), 2(2q − 1 + 2NC(a)))
And according to (4.7) we also have
NC(a) ∼ N
(
NC,
2(NC)2
(2q − 1)
)
Hence T (φ, a) is also a normal deviate. Now we derive the mean µT (φ,a) and
variance σ2T (φ,a) of T (φ, a). Let Φ be the set of all possible samples of size
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N . Then with variable fixation a ∈ Fs2 and variable sample φ ∈ Φ where
|φ| = N , we can write:
µT (φ,a) =
1
2s|Φ|
∑
a∈Fs2,φ∈Φ
T (φ, a)
=
1
2s|Φ|
∑
a∈Fs2
∑
φ∈Φ
Ta(φ)
=
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
1
|Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ
Ta(φ)
=
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
µTa(φ)
=
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
2q − 1 +NC(a)
= 2q − 1 + µNC(a)
= 2q − 1 +NC
Let µµTa(φ) be the mean of µTa(φ) over all the fixation a. That means µT (φ,a) =
µµTa(φ) . So we write
T (φ, a)− µT (φ,a) = T − µTa(φ) + µTa(φ) − µµTa(φ)(
T (φ, a)− µT (φ,a)
)2
=
(
(T (φ, a)− µTa(φ)) + (µTa(φ) − µµTa(φ) )
)2
1
2s|Φ|
∑
a∈Fs2,φ∈Φ
(T (φ, a)− µT (φ,a))2 =
1
2s|Φ|
∑
a∈Fs2,φ∈Φ
(
(T (φ, a)− µTa(φ)) + (µTa(φ) − µµTa(φ) )
)2
σ2T (φ,a) =
1
2s|Φ|
∑
a∈Fs2,φ∈Φ
(
(T (φ, a)− µTa(φ)) + (µTa(φ) − µµTa(φ) )
)2
Consequently we find
σ
2
T (φ,a) =
1
2s|Φ|
∑
a∈Fs2
∑
φ∈Φ
(
(T (φ, a)− µTa(φ))
2
+ 2(T (φ, a)− µTa(φ))(µTa(φ) − µµTa(φ) ) + (µTa(φ) − µµTa(φ) )
2
)
Let MT denote the the middle term at the right side in the above equation.
Now let us analyse MT. (µTa(φ)−µµTa(φ)) part does not depend on the variable
φ because µTa(φ) is the mean of Ta(φ) over all possible φ and µµTa(φ) is a
constant. As a result we can write
MT =
1
2s|Φ|
∑
a∈Fs2
∑
φ∈Φ
2(T (φ, a)− µTa(φ))(µTa(φ) − µµTa(φ))
=
2
2s|Φ|
∑
a∈Fs2
(µTa(φ) − µµTa(φ))
∑
φ∈Φ
(T (φ, a)− µTa(φ))
CHAPTER 4. STATISTICAL DISTINGUISHERS 48
Observe that for a fixed a, Ta (φ) = T (φ, a).As a result we get
MT =
2
2s|Φ|
∑
a∈Fs2
(
µTa(φ) − µµTa(φ)
)(∑
φ∈Φ
Ta (φ)−
∑
φ∈Φ
µTa(φ)
)
By the definition of mean we know that
(∑
φ∈Φ
Ta (φ) =
∑
φ∈Φ
µTa(φ)
)
. This
implies MT = 0. And we can continue deriving the variance of T (φ, a) as
following.
σ2T (φ,a) =
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
1
|Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ
(Ta(φ)− µTa(φ))2 +
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
1
|Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ
(µTa(φ) − µµTa(φ))2
=
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
σ2Ta(φ) +
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
1
|Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ
(2q − 1 +NC(a)− 2q + 1−NC)2
=
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
σ2Ta(φ) +
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
1
|Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ
(NC(a)−NC)2
=
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
σ2Ta(φ) +
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
σ2NC(a)
=
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
2(2q − 1 + 2NC(a)) + 1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
2(NC)2
2q − 1
= 2(2q − 1 + 2NC) + 2(NC)
2
(2q − 1)
=
2(2q − 1 + 2NC)(2q − 1) + 2(NC)2
(2q − 1)
=
2((2q − 1)2 + 2(NC)(2q − 1) + (NC)2
(2q − 1)
=
2
(2q − 1)(2
q − 1 +NC)2
To justify Hypothesis 1 we observe that
2−s
∑
a∈Fs2
pη(a) = 2
−q
as this probability is the probability of the event yq = η taken over all plain-
texts. The variance pη (a) taken over a may not be same for all η ∈ Fq2.
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We will see in the Experiment chapter that the variance of “variance of
pη (a) taken over a” taken over η is nonzero for any number of rounds. And
the experimental and theoretical variance of C (a) taken over all the pos-
sible a also differs by large value. However, interestingly we have found
that, this does not affect the distance in between the theoretical and exper-
imental variance of the statistic T as shown in Figures 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7 for
the case of SMALLPRESENT-[4]. In an upcoming research paper [16], for
SMALLPRESENT-[8], we have observed that the experimental variance of
T is very larger than the theoretical variance but this happens only when the
distinguisher already distinguishes itself from the uniform one. As a result,
such a distance in between theory and experiment does not affect our original
goal significantly.
4.2 Model for Multiple Fixations
Let A ⊆ Fs2 be a set of fixations, φ ⊆ Ft2 be the sample which is sampled
randomly with replacement and Φ is the set of all possible φ. In this context,
the functions Ω : A× φ→ Fq2 and ω : A× Fq2 → Z are defined so that
Ω(a, xt) = yq (4.8)
ω (a, η) = # {Ω (a, xt) = η | xt ∈ φ} (4.9)
where y = E ((a, xt) , K) = (yq, yr) and a ∈ A
4.2.1 A given set of fixations
For a given set of fixations |A| = M and any sample φ such that |φ| = S ≤ 2t,
the size of the domain of the distribution to be distinguished from random
is M2q. The distribution of the function ω is composed of the probabilities
p(a,η)(A). In this context, let the statistic T be denoted by TA (φ) is defined
as
TA(φ) =
∑
a∈A
∑
η∈Fq2
(ω(a, η)−N2−qM−1)2
N2−qM−1
(4.10)
For simplicity, we restrict the considerations to the case where, for each
fixation, the q bits of the ciphertext is computed for equally many, say S,
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different xt ∈ Ft2. Then N = MS, We also observe that for a given a,
wa (φ) = w (φ, a) and Ta (φ) = T (φ, a). Consequently, and we get
TA(φ) =
∑
a∈A
∑
η∈Fq2
(ω(a, η)− S2−q)2
S2−q
=
∑
a∈A
∑
η∈Fq2
(ωa(η)− S2−q)2
S2−q
=
∑
a∈A
Ta(φ)
=
∑
a∈A
T (φ, a)
By Theorem 4.1.1, T (φ, a) is a normal deviate. And from the above equation
we see TA (φ) is a summation of |A| = M number of normally distributed ran-
dom variables. As a result, according to the property of normal distribution
TA (φ) is also normally distributed and we can write
TA(φ) ∼ N
(
MµTa(φ),Mσ
2
Ta(φ)
)
= N
(
M(2q − 1 + SC),M 2(2
q − 1 + SC)2
(2q − 1)
)
= N
(
M(2q − 1) +MSC,M 2(2
q − 1 + SC)2
(2q − 1)
)
Which implies
TA(φ) ∼ N
(
M(2q − 1) +NC, 2M(2
q − 1 + SC)2
(2q − 1)
)
(4.11)
But the tools developed in this thesis work offer also an alternative approach
to determine the distribution of TA(φ). Instead of splitting the domain of the
distribution of (a, η) as a union of subdomains of size 2q we can investigate
the distribution over the large domain directly.
Let the capacity of the distribution p (A) =
(
p(a,η) (A)
)
be denoted by C (A).
We can now define C (A) in the same way C (a) is defined for the distribution
p (a) =
(
p(η) (a)
)
in 3.21 and write
C (A) = |A|2q
∑
(a,η)∈A×Fq2
(
p(a,η) (A)− 1|A|2q
)2
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By plugging in the definition of probability
p(a,η) (A) =
#{xt ∈ Ft2 | xs = a, yq = η}
|A|2t ,
we can write
C (A) = |A|2q
∑
(a,η)∈A×Fq2
(
#{xt ∈ Ft2 | xs = a, yq = η}
|A|2t −
1
|A|2q
)2
(4.12)
Lemma 4.2.1. Let us denote by C(A) the capacity of the distribution over
the values (a, η) ∈ A× Fq2 as xt varies in Ft2. Then
C(A) =
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
C(a)
Proof. Let us recall that C(a) is defined in (3.21) as
C(a) = 2q
∑
η∈Fq2
(
pη (a)− 1
2q
)2
(4.13)
According to definition pη (a) =
#{xt∈Ft2 | xs=a,yq=η}
2t
. By plugging this equality
in 4.13, we continue as following
|A|−1
∑
a∈A
C(a) = |A|−1
∑
a∈A
2q
∑
η∈Fq2
(
#{xt ∈ Ft2 | xs = a, yq = η}
2t
− 1
2q
)2
= |A|−12q
∑
a∈A
∑
η∈Fq2
(
#{xt ∈ Ft2 | xs = a, yq = η}
2t
− 1
2q
)2
= |A|−12q
∑
η∈Fq2,a∈A
(
#{xt ∈ Ft2 | xs = a, yq = η}
2t
− 1
2q
)2
= |A|−12q
∑
η∈Fq2,a∈A
|A|2
|A|2
(
#{xt ∈ Ft2 | xs = a, yq = η}
2t
− 1
2q
)2
= |A|2q
∑
η∈Fq2,a∈A
(
#{xt ∈ Ft2 | xs = a, yq = η}
|A|2t −
1
|A|2q
)2
Now using (4.12) in the last equality above, we have
|A|−1
∑
a∈A
C(a) = C(A), that is
C(A) =
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
C(a)
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Lemma 4.2.2. Let A be a set of fixations such that A ⊆ Fs2 and |A| = M
and C(A) be the capacity of the distribution (a, η) where a ∈ A and η ∈ Fq2.
The average capacity of C(A) as A runs over all possible subset of Fs2 such
that |A| = M is C which is also the average capacity of C(a)
Proof. Let µC(A) denote the average capacity of C(A) and F be the set family
that contains all the M -subset of Fs2. Then we can write
µC(A) =
1
|F|
∑
A∈F
C(A)
Now as per the Lemma 4.2.1 we can write
µC(A) =
1
|F|
∑
A∈F
|A|−1
∑
a∈A
C(a)
=
1
|F|M
∑
A∈F
∑
a∈A
C(a)
=
1
|F|M
∑
A∈F ,a∈A
C(a)
=
1
|F|M
∑
A∈F ,a∈A
C(a)
Observe that |F| = (2s
M
)
. As A runs through F and a runs through each of
these M -subsets, each term C (a) for each a ∈ Fs2 occurs
(
2s−1
M−1
)
many times.
So, we can continue with the proof as following
µC(A) =
(
2s−1
M−1
)(
2s
M
)
M
∑
a∈Fs2
C(a)
=
1
2s
∑
a∈Fs2
C(a)
= C
Corollary 4.2.2.1. The capacity C(A) of set A of size M is approximately
a normal deviate with mean µC(A) = C and variance σ
2
C(A) =
2C2
M(2q−1)
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Proof. We know C (a) is a normal deviate. According to the definition, C (A)
is average of C (a) over all the a ∈ A. We know that average of a collection
of normally distributed random variable is also normally distributed. Con-
sequently C (A) is a normal deviate. From lemma 2 we see that the mean
µC(A) = C. We know C (A) =
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
C (a). So variance of C (A) will be 1|A|2
times the variance of
∑
a∈A
C (a). And variance of
∑
a∈A
C (a) is |A| times the
variance of C (a). As a result, we write
σ2C(A) =
1
|A|2 |A|σ
2
C(a)
=
2C2
M(2q − 1)
Corollary 4.2.2.2. For each fixed set A ⊆ Fs2 such that |A| = M and
variable sample of size N = MS where S is the size of the sample φ ⊆ Ft2
drawn randomly with replacement for each fixation a ∈ A, the statistic TA(φ)
is χ2-distributed with non-central parameter δ(A) = NC(A) where degree of
freedom is M2q − 1. That is
TA(φ) ∼ χ2M2q−1(NC(A))
Proof. Recall the definition of TA(φ)
TA(φ) =
∑
a∈A
∑
η∈Fq2
(ω(a, η)−N2−qM−1)2
N2−qM−1
Here ω(a, η) is non-uniformly binomially distributed. So the mean and vari-
ance of ω(a, η) are µω(a,η) = Np(a,η) (A) and σ
2
ω(a,η) =
N
M2q
. Where
(
p(a,η)(A)
)
is the probability distribution of function ω. As a result we get
TA(φ) =
∑
a∈A
∑
η∈Fq2
(ω(a, η)− µω(a,η))2
σ2ω(a,η)
Now let us assume that X = ω(a, η)− σ2ω(a,η). Then the mean and variance
of X are µX = Np(a,η)(A)− NM2q and σ2X = NM2q . So we write
TA(φ) =
∑
a∈A,η∈Fq2
(X)2
σ2X
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Now as per the definition of non-central χ2 distribution we see that
TA(φ) ∼ χ2|A|2q−1(δ(A))
TA(φ) ∼ χ2M2q−1(δ(A))
where
δ(A) =
∑
a∈A,η∈Fq2
µ2X
σ2X
=
∑
a∈A,η∈Fq2
(Np(a,η)(A)− NM2q )2
N
M2q
= NM2q
∑
a∈A,η∈Fq2
(
p(a,η)(A)− 1
M2q
)2
= NM2q
∑
a∈A,η∈Fq2
(
1
|A|p(η)(a)−
1
M2q
)2
= NM
∑
a∈A
2q
∑
η∈Fq2
(
1
|M |p(η)(a)−
1
M2q
)2
= NM
∑
a∈A
1
M2
2q
∑
η∈Fq2
(
p(η)(a)− 1
2q
)2
= N
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
C (a)
= NC(A)
The last equality is as per Lemma 4.2.1. That means:
TA(φ) ∼ χ2M2q−1(NC(A))
So now as per the property of χ2-distribution the mean and variance of TA(φ)
are
µTA(φ) = M2
q − 1 +NC(A) (4.14)
σ2TA(φ) = 2(M2
q − 1 + 2NC(A)) (4.15)
And according to the normal approximation of χ2-distribution mentioned in
Section 3.1.5, we have
TA(φ) ∼ N (M2q − 1 +NC(A), 2(M2q − 1 + 2NC(A))) (4.16)
where φ is sampled randomly with replacement.
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4.2.2 A variable set of fixations
Lemma 4.2.3. Now let us consider the statistic T (φ,A) where the sample φ
of size S which is sampled randomly with replacement and the set of fixations
A of size M both are variable and N = MS. Then the mean and variance
of T (φ,A) are
µT (φ,A) = M2
q − 1 +NC
σ2T (φ,A) = 2(M2
q − 1 + 2NC) +N2σ2C(A)
Proof. Let Φ is the set of all the φ with |φ| = S. According to the definition,
the mean of T (a, φ) over all the possible value of a and φ is
µT (φ,A) =
1
|F||Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ,A∈F
T (φ,A) (4.17)
It is immediate to see that for a given set of fixations A, T (φ,A) = TA (φ).
Using this equality in (4.17), we obtain
µT (φ,A) =
1
|F|
∑
A∈F
1
|Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ
TA (φ)
Consequently we can write
µT (φ,A) =
1
|F|
∑
A∈|F|
µTA(φ) (4.18)
= µµTA(φ) (4.19)
Now, by plugging (4.14) in (4.18) we obtain
µT (φ,A) =
1
|F|
∑
A∈|F|
(M2q − 1 +NC(A))
=
|F|(M2q − 1)
|F| +
1
|F|
∑
A∈|F|
(NC(A))
= M2q − 1 +NµC(A)
By applying the Lemma 4.2.2 in the last equality above, we can write
µT (φ,A) = M2
q − 1 +NC (4.20)
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Using (4.19), we can write
T (φ,A)− µT (φ,A) = T (φ,A)− µTA(φ) + µTA(φ) − µµTA(φ) (4.21)
Taking the average of the square of both side of (4.21) over all the possible
fixations and samples we have
σ2T (φ,A) =
1
|F||Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ,A∈F
(T (φ,A)− µTA(φ) + µTA(φ) − µµTA(φ))
2
By expanding the right side of the above equation we can write
σ2T (φ,A) =
1
|F||Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ,A∈F
(T (φ,A)− µTA(φ))2
+
1
|F||Φ|
∑
(µTA(φ) − µµTA(φ))
2
+
1
|F||Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ,A∈F
2(T (φ,A)− µTA(φ))(µTA(φ) − µµTA(φ))
Let MT denote the the third term at the right side in the above equation.
Now let us analyse MT. (µTA(φ)−µµTA(φ)) part does not depend on the variable
φ because µTA(φ) is the mean of TA(φ) over all possible φ and µµTA(φ) is a
constant. As a result we can write
MT =
1
|F||Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ,A∈F
2
(
T (φ,A)− µTφ,a(A)
) (
µTA(φ) − µµTA(φ)
)
=
2
|F||Φ|
∑
A∈F
(
µTA(φ) − µµTA(φ)
)∑
φ∈Φ
(
T (φ,A)− µTA(φ)
)
Observe that for a fixed A, TA (φ) = T (φ,A).As a result we get
MT =
2
|F||Φ|
∑
A∈Fs2
(
µTA(φ) − µµTA(φ)
)(∑
φ∈Φ
TA (φ)−
∑
φ∈Φ
µTA(φ)
)
By the definition of mean we know that
(∑
φ∈Φ
TA (φ) =
∑
φ∈Φ
µTA(φ)
)
. This
implies MT = 0. And we can continue deriving the variance of T (φ,A) as
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following.
σ2T (φ,A) =
1
|F|
∑
A∈F
1
|Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ
(TA (φ)− µTA(φ))2
+
1
|F||Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ,A∈F
(M2q − 1 +NC(A)−M2q + 1−NC)2
By simplifying the right side of the above equation we obtain
σ2T (φ,A) =
1
|F|
∑
A∈F
σ2TA(φ) +
1
|F||Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ,A∈F
(NC(A)−NC)2 (4.22)
Now by using the (4.15) in (4.22) we can continue the derivation as following
σ2T (φ,A) =
1
|F|
∑
A∈F
2(M2q − 1 + 2NC(A)) + 1|F||Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ,A∈F
(NC(A)−NC)2
=
1
|F|
∑
A∈F
2(M2q − 1) + 4NC(A) + N
2
|F||Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ,A∈F
(C(A)− C)2
The mean of C (A) over all possible A is C according to Lemma 4.2.2. So,
according to the definition of the variance of any statistic and using the fact
that 2 (M2q − 1) , 4N , and σ2C(A) over all possible A are constant, we can
write the following:
σ2T (φ,A) = 2(M2
q − 1) + 4N|F|
∑
A∈F
C(A) +
N2
|Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ
1
|F|
∑
A∈F
(C(A)− C)2
= 2(M2q − 1) + 4N|F|
∑
A∈F
C(A) +
N2
|Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ
σ2C(A)
= 2(M2q − 1) + 4NC +N2σ2C(A)
= 2(M2q − 1 + 2NC) +N2σ2C(A)
Recall that our objective is to find the distribution of the statistic T and in
this context, T (a, φ). From Lemma 4.2.3, we can find the mean and variance
of T (a, φ). And from Corollary 4.2.2.1, we find the value of σ2C(A). So, by
using the corollary in the lemma, we can continue computing the variance of
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T (a, φ) as following
σ2T (φ,A) = 2(M2
q − 1 + 2NC) +N2σ2C(A)
= 2(M2q − 1 + 2NC) + 2(NC)
2
M(2q − 1)
=
2(M2q −M +M − 1 + 2NC)M(2q − 1) + 2(NC)2
M(2q − 1)
=
2(M(2q − 1) + (M − 1) + 2NC)M(2q − 1) + 2(NC)2
M(2q − 1)
=
2((M(2q − 1))2 +M(2q − 1)(M − 1) + 2NCM(2q − 1)) + (NC)2
M(2q − 1)
=
2((M(2q − 1))2 + 2NCM(2q − 1)) + (NC)2
M(2q − 1) +
2M(2q − 1)(M − 1)
M(2q − 1)
=
2(M(2q − 1) +NC)2
M(2q − 1) + 2(M − 1)
As mentioned in Section 3.1.6, TA(φ)-is approximately normally distributed.
Now as C(A) is normally distributed, so is NC (A). As a result, T (φ,A) is
also normally distributed. That is
T (φ,A) ∼ N (µT (φ,A), σ2T (φ,A))
And consequently
T (φ,A) ∼ N
(
M2q − 1 +NC, 2(M(2
q − 1) +NC)2
M(2q − 1) + 2(M − 1)
)
where φ is sampled randomly with replacement. We observe that for suffi-
ciently large value of q, the term 2(M − 1) is negligibly small in the above
variance. And q is always sufficiently large. To simplify the analysis of the
data complexity of the distinguisher based on the statistic T (φ,A) we have
used the following approximation
T (φ,A) ∼ N
(
M2q − 1 +NC, 2(M(2
q − 1) +NC)2
M(2q − 1)
)
(4.23)
Chapter 5
Data Complexity of SSA
In [5], the connection in between SS an TD is used to explain the statistical
behaviour of the SS attack. In this thesis, we have developed a statistical
model for the SS attack using the distribution properties directly and in this
section we will derive the data complexity of an SS attack directly based on
the success probabilities of the statistical test described in Section 3.3.
Let us consider the statistic T computed from a set of fixations as defined in
(4.10). The set of fixations is denoted by A such that |A| = M . And let us
set T0 = T when the function ω is uniformly distributed. Otherwise T1 = T .
By the definition of χ2 distribution, both the statisti T0, T1 is χ
2 distributed.
So, accoridng to the normal approximation of χ2 distribution we find the
mean µT0 and variance σ
2
T0
of the statistic T0 as following:
µT0 = M2
q − 1 (5.1)
σ2T0 = 2(M2
q − 1) (5.2)
On the other hand, from (4.23), we know the mean µT1 and variance σ
2
T1
of
the statistic T1 are as following:
µT1 = M2
q − 1 +NC (5.3)
σ2T1 =
2(M(2q − 1) +NC)2
M(2q − 1) (5.4)
Now, let us find out what is the required value of N to successfully perform
the statistical test mentioned in Section 3.3. To perform the test we need to
find out a value of τ so that we can succeed in the test with certain minimum
success probability. If α0, α1 is the maximum error probability of wrongly
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choosing distribution T1 and T0, then according to inequality 3.30 and as
depicted in Figure 3.5, we can choose τ as following
µT0 + σT0ζ0 = τ = µT1 − σT1ζ1 (5.5)
where Φ(ζi) = 1−αi for i ∈ Z2 for the cumulative distribution function Φ of
the standard normal distribution. Without loss of generality let us assume
that α0 > α1. Then the minimum success probability is 1− α0. Using (5.5),
we have derived a lower bound of N to achieve the mentioned minimum
probability of succeeding in the test.
According to (5.1) and (5.3) we find that
µT1 = µT0 +NC (5.6)
Plugging the above equality in (5.5), we find
µT0 + σT0ζ0 = µT0 +NC −
√
2 (M (2q − 1) +NC)2
M (2q − 1) ζ1
σT0ζ0 = NC −
√
2 (M (2q − 1) +NC)2
M (2q − 1) ζ1
By setting NC = θ and M (2q − 1) = Θ, we obtain
σT0ζ0 = θ −
√
2 (Θ + θ)2
Θ
ζ1
σT0ζ0 = θ −
√
2
Θ
(Θ + θ) ζ1
σT0ζ0 = θ −
√
2Θζ1 −
√
2
Θ
θζ1
θ
(
1−
√
2
Θ
ζ1
)
= σT0ζ0 +
√
2Θζ1
By replacing back the values of θ and Θ, and plugging in the value of σT0
from 5.2, we obtain the following
NC
(
1−
√
2
M (2q − 1)ζ1
)
=
√
2(M2q − 1)ζ0 +
√
2M (2q − 1)ζ1
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We take a simple over estimate of
√
2M (2q − 1) by √2(M2q − 1) and get
NSS =
√
2(M2q − 1) (ζ0 + ζ1)(
1−
√
2
M(2q−1)ζ1
)
C
Note that NSS is a lower bound. That is, the statsitical test will be successfull
with the considered success probabilities for any larger value of N as well.
Chapter 6
Experiment and Evaluation
In the study of this thesis, we have considered different statistics of different
types of distributions. However, we will limit our experiments in the following
two statistics.
1. Distribution of the capacities C(a) as the fixation a varies as approxi-
mated in Theorem 3.2.1. Here C is the average of C (a) over all possible
a. It is also the capacity of the ML approximation.
2. The distribution of T (φ, a) as both the data sample φ and the fixation
a vary randomly. This distribution is approximated in Theorem 4.1.1.
The objective of the experiments is to check how well the experimental dis-
tributions of the above mentioned statistics agree with the theoretical ap-
proximations. In case of the experiment for the first statistic mentioned in
the above list, we have to compute the capacity of the distribution of the
values at the output of the SS trail. It requires to encrypt the whole code-
book. Encrypting the whole codebook is impossible for the cipher PRESENT
described in Section 2.4. Because the size of the full codebook for this ci-
pher is 264 which is too large to handle with the computational capabil-
ity that we have. To avoid this problem, we have considered smaller ver-
sions of PRESENT called SMALLPRESENT-[4] and SMALLPRERSENT-
[8]. In principle, they are exactly the same PRESENT we have defined
in section 2.4 but with only 4 and 8 S-boxes. Specifications of smaller
variants of PRESENT can be found in [12]. However, we have dicussed
SMALLPRESENT-[n] in general, in Section 6.1, for the sake of the continu-
ity of our discussion.
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6.1 SMALLPRESENT-[n]
It is a similar SPN as we have discussed in section 2.4. The differences are,
in SMALLPRESENT-[n], the block size is 4n. And in the sBoxLayer, there
are n copies of the same S-box which is used in the original PRESENT. The
pLayer is given by the following function P . Bit at the position i of the state
is moved to bit position P (i), where
P (i) =
{
n× i mod 4n− 1 for 0 ≤ i < 4n− 1
4n− 1 for i = 4n− 1
We note that for n = 16, this is exactly the linear transformation used in
PRESENT that we have discussed in 2.4. Figure 6.2 and 6.3 shows the pLayer
of SMALLPRESENT-[4] and SMALLPRESENT-[8] respectiviely. However,
as the block size is now 4n, the key scheduling algorithm requires a modi-
fication that produces kyes of length 4n in every round. It is achieved by
considering the 4n rightmost bits of the corresponding round key of the orig-
inial PRESENT. Which means, there is no modification in the key scheduling
algorithm but there is a modification in the bits which are considered as a
round key. With these specifications, it is clear that when we set n = 16,
SMALLPRESENT-[n] becomes the PRESENT that we have discussed in
Section 2.4
Now as we have defined SMALLPRESENT-[n], we need to find feasible SS
trails in the pLayers of them, so that we can use these trails in our ex-
periments. In Section 2.7, we have discussed the principle of choosing an
SS trail from the pLayer of an SPN. Based on this principle, in the rest
of the sections of this chapter, we have chosen useful SS trails for both of
the SMALLPRESENT-[4] and SMALLPRESENT-[8] . However, we will
limit our experiments only for the case of SMALLPRESENT-[4]. We are
also experimenting on SMALLPRESENT-[8] considering sampling without
replacement and the result will be published in an upcoming research paper.
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6.2 SS Trails in SMALLPRESENT-[n]
6.2.1 SMALLPRESENT-[4]
In SMALLPRESENT-[4], there are only 4 S-boxes. That means the block
size is 16 bits. Figure 6.1 shows the non-linear layer of SMALLPRESENT-
[4]. The SS trail mentioned in bold lines has 8 single bit trails in each of
those three S-boxes. However, we have not conducted our experiment based
on this trail because there are only a few bits left to obtain a sufficiently large
sample for each fixation of those 9 input bits of the trail. Fortunately, there
3 2 1 0
3 2 1 0
Figure 6.1: 9 bit SS trail in SMALLPRESENT-[4].
is another good trail if we consider the middle two bits of the middle two
S-boxes. Because these four bits are involved only among the middle two S-
boxes. That is, we have a SS trail of 4 bits with only 2 active S-boxes. Figure
6.2 shows this trail in bold lines. We have used this trail in our experiments
later in this chapter.
6.2.2 SMALLPRESENT-[8]
In SMALLPRESENT-[8], there are 8 S-boxes. That means the block size
is 32 bits. Figure 6.3 shows the non-linear layer of SMALLPRESENT-[8].
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3 2 1 0
3 2 1 0
Figure 6.2: 4 bit SS trail in SMALLPRESENT-[4].
Based on the principle of choosing an SS trail, we have chosen the trail
mentioned in bold lines in this figure.
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Figure 6.3: 8 bit SS trail in SMALLPRESENT-[8].
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6.3 Experiments on SMALLPRESENT-[4]
The trail mentioned in bold lines in Figure 6.2 is used in these experiments.
All the samples that we have used in our experiments are drawn randomly
with replacement. At first we investigate the distribution of C (a) as a varies.
As the purpose is to investigate the distribution of C(a), we do not need to
consider the key. Then we investigate the distribution of the statistic T for
a single fixation where both of the fixation and the sample are varible. Here
a is a four bit value, and the size of the distribution is |Y | = 24. In the
following sections we present the experimental results.
6.3.1 SSA Capacities C(a):
Here C(a) is the capacity of the distribution p (a) = (pη (a)) where a ∈ F42 is
the fixation at the input of the trail and η ∈ F42 is the value at the output
of the trail. Which means, C(a) is actually Cp(a) as it is defined in Section
3.2.1. And it is computed according to (3.20). The experimental value of
the variance of C(a) is computed over all the possible fixations a ∈ F42. The
theoretical variance is computed according to Theorem 3.2.1. The result is
presented in Table 6.1.
From comparative analysis point of view, we observe that, for some numbers
of rounds the practical variance is closer to the theoretical one than some
other rounds. Now it would be interesting to check how this result agrees
with Hypothesis 1. The question is, if the variances of C(a) is comparatively
far from the values predicted by the model, then, is it due to the fact that the
probability distributions of pη(a) is also far from satisfying the hypothesis?
That is, are the variances of pη(a) vary a lot with η? Similarly, if the variance
of C(a) is comparatively closer to the prediction by the model, is it also the
case that pη(a) have smaller variances? Here pη (a) is calculated using the
formula mentioned in (3.19). Which in our case looks like following:
pη (a) =
1
212
{x|Ek (x, a) = η}
Table 6.1 also compares “Distance between theoretical and experimental
σ2C(a)” with “variance of σ
2
pη(a)
over all η”
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Table 6.1
Round C = σ2
C(a)
σ2
C(a)
Distance Variance of σ2
pη(a)
1
24
∑
a∈F42 C(a) (Experimental) (Theoretical) (over all η)
1 1.2500000000 0.000000000000 0.208333328366 0.208333328366 0.000000000000000
2 0.0864257812 0.000053644180 0.000995922135 0.000942277955 0.000000000818545
3 0.0263200998 0.000082312916 0.000092366354 0.000010053438 0.000000001487419
4 0.0084733963 0.000012357389 0.000009573126 0.000002784263 0.000000000223686
5 0.0046606063 0.000002714300 0.000002896167 0.000000181867 0.000000000046755
6 0.0039848089 0.000002259238 0.000002117160 0.000000142078 0.000000000014765
7 0.0029691457 0.000000661685 0.000001175444 0.000000513759 0.000000000015007
8 0.0041698217 0.000001235339 0.000002318322 0.000001082983 0.000000000019639
9 0.0041134357 0.000002544029 0.000002256047 0.000000287982 0.000000000015644
10 0.0029462575 0.000001245313 0.000001157391 0.000000087922 0.000000000024034
11 0.0030920505 0.000000583181 0.000001274770 0.000000691590 0.000000000015651
12 0.0034888982 0.000002455807 0.000001622988 0.000000832819 0.000000000030971
13 0.0038551092 0.000001477955 0.000001981582 0.000000503627 0.000000000017599
14 0.0035421848 0.000001178269 0.000001672943 0.000000494674 0.000000000022411
15 0.0033624172 0.000001049226 0.000001507447 0.000000458220 0.000000000015530
16 0.0040042400 0.000001861589 0.000002137858 0.000000276270 0.000000000012828
17 0.0033563375 0.000000747953 0.000001502000 0.000000754047 0.000000000013699
18 0.0033963918 0.000001104406 0.000001538064 0.000000433658 0.000000000016437
19 0.0035276412 0.000001275685 0.000001659234 0.000000383549 0.000000000009210
20 0.0036349296 0.000002631222 0.000001761695 0.000000869527 0.000000000026018
21 0.0034182071 0.000001446692 0.000001557885 0.000000111193 0.000000000017467
22 0.0035172700 0.000004566781 0.000001649492 0.000002917289 0.000000000038211
23 0.0029666423 0.000001265739 0.000001173462 0.000000092277 0.000000000009836
24 0.0026813745 0.000000865261 0.000000958636 0.000000093375 0.000000000012813
25 0.0035705566 0.000002094620 0.000001699850 0.000000394770 0.000000000024349
26 0.0033077001 0.000000503365 0.000001458784 0.000000955419 0.000000000018401
27 0.0032589435 0.000001036276 0.000001416095 0.000000379819 0.000000000020941
28 0.0035127401 0.000002022870 0.000001645246 0.000000377624 0.000000000025578
29 0.0032626390 0.000001063931 0.000001419308 0.000000355377 0.000000000015406
30 0.0038447380 0.000002793566 0.000001970935 0.000000822632 0.000000000035005
31 0.0032460689 0.000001083049 0.000001404929 0.000000321879 0.000000000040317
Comparatively, we find that the theoretical model disagrees strongly in round
22 but agrees better in round 23. And interestingly we find that the variance
of pη(a) over all η in round 22 is very large but comparatively small in round
23. This suggests that the smaller the distance between the theoretical model
and the experimental computation, the closer the hypothesis tends to be
valid.
One important thing to note here is that we do not yet have a proper under-
standing of what is a small difference or what is a large difference in between
the theoretical and experimental values. But we know that our objective is to
be a able to distinguish a distribution from random. In other words, we need
to know, how useful the theoretical models are, when we use them to perform
the statistical test. To visualize this effect, let us check how the theoretical
and experimental values of the statistic T (φ, a) evolves as the sample size
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grows and when they start to distinguish from the random distribution.
6.3.2 Statistic T (φ, a)
For each fixation a we draw a line for the statistic T (φ, a) computed from
experimental data. We plot the size of the sample in the X-axis. The same
sample is used for all the fixations. That is, For all samples φ1, φ2 used
in the experiment, if |φ1| = |φ2|, then φ1 = φ2. And if |φ1| < |φ2|, then
φ1 ⊂ φ2. We also draw the lines for variable fixation and variable sample
calculated from theoretical distribution as in Theorem 4.1.1 and presented in
gray color. The dark gray area represents 1 standard deviation around the
theoretical mean. And the light gray area represents 2 standard deviation
around the theoretical mean. We draw the plotting for round 3, 4, 22 and 23
in Figures 6.4, 6.5,6.6 and 6.7. The reason to draw the plot of round 3 and 4
is to see how the evolution of the statistic happens in case of smaller number
of rounds. And round 22, 23 are chosen as they were found interesting in
previous section. Observe that, in all the cases of round 3, 4, 22 and 23,
they are in close accordance with the theoretical distribution. And in the
cases of round 3 and 4, both of the theoretical and experimental distribution
distinguishes itself from the uniformly random distribution.
These plots are also in close accordance with the theoretical data complexity
NSS that we have derived in previous chapter. In practice, distinguishing
becomes possible when the sample size is large enough so that all the red
lines are clearly above the random (T = 15). In theory, we can calculate
the estimates of NSS using (5.7). First we set the values of ζ0 = ζ1 to√
2 which theoretically suppose to provide 85% success probability of the
statistical test. Then using the values of C for the corresponding round
gives the theoretical estimation of NSS for that particular round. We see
that using this method the theoretical values of NSS for round 3, 4, 22 and
23 are around 210.20, 211.84, 213.1 and 213.35 respectively. In contrast, from the
experimental plots we see that the red lines start to distinguish at around
the same values of |φ| in the horizontal axis for the case of round 3 and 4.
From the theoretical values of NSS for round 22 and 23, we also find that it
distinguishes at the value of NSS which is larger than the full codebook for
a fixation. And this is also visible in the plots of those rounds. They do not
distinguish at all.
So far, in the experiments of T (φ, a), we have used the same sample of equal
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Figure 6.4: T (φ, a) with 3 rounds
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Figure 6.5: T (φ, a) with 4 rounds
size for each fixation. Now, let us do the experiment in another way. Let us
look at distribution of T (φ, a) for a particular round using different fixations
and samples of similar sizes. We have used all the possible fixations from 0x0
to 0xf. For each fixation, we have 10000 samples. Each sample has a size of
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION 70
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
log2 |φ|
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
T(
φ,
a)
For all φ1 ,φ2  if |φ1 |=|φ2 | then φ1 =φ2
For all φ1 ,φ2  if |φ1 |<|φ2 | then φ1 ⊂φ2
The dark gray portion is 1 standard deviation around mean of T(φ,a)
The light gray portion is 2 standard deviation around mean of T(φ,a)
T(φ,a) in SMALLPRESENT-[4] with all zero key upto 22 rounds
Figure 6.6: T (φ, a) with 22 rounds
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Figure 6.7: T (φ, a) with 23 rounds
2048 plaintexts and they are chosen randomly with replacement. In this way
we had 10000×16 = 160000 different T (φ, a) values. We have calculated the
mean and variance of these values of T . Then we have compared these with
the theoretical values obtained from Theorem 4.1.1. Figures 6.8,6.9,6.10 and
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6.11 shows the theoretical and experimental distribution for round 03, 04, 22
and 23. We observe that the experimental distribution is a little skewed than
the theoretical distribution. This is expected as the statistic is originally χ2
distributed and we have used a normal approximation of χ2 distribution.
As the normal approximation of χ2 distribution is better satisfied for higher
degree of freedom, we understand that the experimental and theoretical dis-
tribution will agree better as the number of bits at the output of the SS trail
grows. Note that, as like the previous visualization, we observe the same
phenomenon in these plots also. For round 3 it nicely distinguishes from
uniform distribution. For round 4 it looks slightly worse. Nevertheless, it is
understandable that the NSS for round 4 is 2
11.84 and we have used sample
of size 211 only. And for round 22 and 23, they do not distinguishes at all.
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T(φ,a) for where a is variable and |φ|=2048 using 10000 different samples
Figure 6.8: T (φ, a) with 03 rounds
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Figure 6.9: T (φ, a) with 04 rounds
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Figure 6.10: T (φ, a) with 22 rounds
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Figure 6.11: T (φ, a) with 23 rounds
Chapter 7
Conclusions
SSA is a comparatively recent statistical cryptanalytic technique among var-
ious others, as for example linear and differential cryptanalysis. Researchers
have tried and established statistical links among different techniques. Blon-
deau and Nyberg showed one important link in between TD and SS attacks.
They showed that TD attack using structures is identical to the sampling al-
gorithm of SSA [5]. Then they used the statistical model of the TD attack to
explain the behaviour of SS attack. However, there was no statistical model
available which was developed based on the properties of SSA directly. In
this thesis, we used the distribution at the output of an SS trail directly to
develop a statistical model instead of using any link with other techniques.
If an SS trail is chosen wisely as discussed in Chapter 2, then there is a
significant degree of non-uniformity in the distribution of the values at the
output of the trail. As discussed in Chapter 2, to perform an SSA, we
are in need of an attack that distinguishes the non-uniform distribution from
uniform distribution, which eventually can be transformed into a key recovery
attack. This thesis has focused only on this distinguishing attack and has not
discussed the key recovery attack in detail. In Chapter 3, we have presented
a statistical test that can perform this distinguishing attack. To perform the
statistical test we have developed the statistic T based on the distribution
of the values at the output bits of the SS trail, when the bits at the input
of the SS trail are fixed and sufficiently many plaintexts are encrypted. The
plaintexts differ from each other only in the non-trail input bits.
In Chapter 4, we have derived the distribution of a few different variants
of this statistic T . We have shown that all of these variants of T , which
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are originally χ2 distributed are also approximately normally distributed.
The mean and variance of all of these variants of T are also derived in this
chapter, which enables us to perform the statistical test. We also have derived
a reasonable overestimation of the number of required plaintexts (in Chapter
5) to be encrypted to perform the distinguishing attack with an arbitrarily
fixed success probability, which is referred as the data complexity of SSA and
denoted by NSS. Finally, in Chapter 6, we have verified the statistical model
by experimenting on a small variant of the block cipher PRESENT called
SMALLPRESENT-[4] for the case of a single fixation. The result shows
that, the distinguishing attack is successful with very high success probability
within the theoretical data complexity bound for smaller rounds. For large
number of rounds, the theoretical data complexity is larger than the full code
book excluding the fixed bits. As a result they do not distinguish at all using
a single fixation. It could be the case that if we used multiple fixations, the
distinguisher would distinguish itself from the uniform distribution. That is,
there is a scope of more experiments based on multiple fixations.
Both in the theories and experiments it has been considered that, the sample
for each fixation is chosen randomly with replacement. When the sample
size approaches the full code book excluding the fixed bits, the only sensible
option is to use sampling without replacement. However, in real life crypt-
analysis the sample size almost never appraoches the full codebook. As a
result, we recon, sampling with replacement is good enough for a success-
full distinguishing attack. However, in an upcoming paper [16], the case of
sampling without replacement is considered. And the experiments have also
been extended to SMALLPRESENT-[8] for both of the cases of sampling
with or without replacement.
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